WEBVTT 1 00:00.000 --> 00:04.720 Well, it's time to move on to talk about wireless security. 2 00:04.720 --> 00:09.030 And we want to start by identifying the reasons why security is such a big deal 3 00:09.030 --> 00:09.800 in the wireless 4 00:09.800 --> 00:10.800 world. 5 00:10.800 --> 00:16.760 And so much of it has to do with our RF propagation, our radio frequency, the 6 00:16.760 --> 00:17.800 fact that when we 7 00:17.800 --> 00:22.000 communicate with wireless, it goes everywhere. 8 00:22.000 --> 00:25.720 A lot of times when we are first learning wireless, we might draw a diagram 9 00:25.720 --> 00:26.400 like this, 10 00:26.400 --> 00:31.540 or we say there's a user down here, maybe they have a phone or a tablet or even WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 10 00:26.400 --> 00:31.540 or we say there's a user down here, maybe they have a phone or a tablet or even 11 00:31.540 --> 00:32.200 a laptop 12 00:32.200 --> 00:33.360 here. 13 00:33.360 --> 00:37.200 And we like to draw these lines like it's communicating with the access point. 14 00:37.200 --> 00:40.860 In fact, I've been using these lines to represent wireless communication 15 00:40.860 --> 00:42.720 throughout this skill. 16 00:42.720 --> 00:46.550 And it makes it look like it's very linear, or communicating back and forth 17 00:46.550 --> 00:47.320 like this. 18 00:47.320 --> 00:49.640 But that's not what actually is happening. 19 00:49.640 --> 00:55.140 When we think about RF, it's going to go out and radiate in a 360 degree 20 00:55.140 --> 00:56.640 pattern depending 21 00:56.640 --> 01:01.870 a little bit, or a lot of it, on the antennas, depending on which antennas we WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 21 00:56.640 --> 01:01.870 a little bit, or a lot of it, on the antennas, depending on which antennas we 22 01:01.870 --> 01:03.080 've deployed. 23 01:03.080 --> 01:06.490 So when we talked about antennas earlier on, we talked about these being omnid 24 01:06.490 --> 01:07.120 irectional 25 01:07.120 --> 01:08.520 antennas. 26 01:08.520 --> 01:13.640 And when we look at omnidirectional antennas from above, I can put an access 27 01:13.640 --> 01:14.440 point here 28 01:14.440 --> 01:18.000 on, let's say, a floor map. 29 01:18.000 --> 01:22.680 Now we're looking at the plans for our building, so we've got rooms in here and 30 01:22.680 --> 01:23.720 hallways and 31 01:23.720 --> 01:26.000 so on and so forth. 32 01:26.000 --> 01:30.700 And now all of a sudden we've got this access point that's sort of in the WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 32 01:26.000 --> 01:30.700 And now all of a sudden we've got this access point that's sort of in the 33 01:30.700 --> 01:31.960 hallway here. 34 01:31.960 --> 01:36.370 And when we look at the wireless propagation, it goes out radially all the way 35 01:36.370 --> 01:37.120 around it. 36 01:37.120 --> 01:40.880 Now I'm not drawing perfect circles, but we probably get the point. 37 01:40.880 --> 01:48.280 I might have my user over here, and that user is down here in this room. 38 01:48.280 --> 01:53.320 And so I might think that I'm communicating directly with this access point. 39 01:53.320 --> 01:57.090 But in order for the access point to communicate with the user in this 40 01:57.090 --> 01:58.440 direction, it's also 41 01:58.440 --> 02:03.040 going to have to send that same signal this direction and out into the parking WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 41 01:58.440 --> 02:03.040 going to have to send that same signal this direction and out into the parking 42 02:03.040 --> 02:03.560 lot. 43 02:03.560 --> 02:07.940 And over to this office, or maybe it's a waiting room where we have guests 44 02:07.940 --> 02:09.320 sitting around. 45 02:09.320 --> 02:11.520 And so we see the problem right away. 46 02:11.520 --> 02:16.880 The propagation of our RF means that our signals just go everywhere. 47 02:16.880 --> 02:21.080 It's easy for them to find recipients and users. 48 02:21.080 --> 02:24.460 Maybe there's a user in here with a wireless device, and they're going to get 49 02:24.460 --> 02:26.080 that communication. 50 02:26.080 --> 02:29.020 And for that matter, maybe we have threat actors who are hanging out in the 51 02:29.020 --> 02:31.120 parking lot, and WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 51 02:29.020 --> 02:31.120 parking lot, and 52 02:31.120 --> 02:33.160 they have a laptop. 53 02:33.160 --> 02:36.850 And now their laptop is receiving the wireless signal that was intended to be 54 02:36.850 --> 02:37.520 received by 55 02:37.520 --> 02:41.640 somebody on the opposite side of the building. 56 02:41.640 --> 02:45.030 Sometimes this is beneficial because I might want wireless communication from 57 02:45.030 --> 02:45.600 this access 58 02:45.600 --> 02:50.720 point to be received in all of these different office spaces. 59 02:50.720 --> 02:55.230 However, it can also be harmful to us because again, it makes it so threat 60 02:55.230 --> 02:56.320 actors now have 61 02:56.320 --> 02:59.040 access to our wireless communications. 62 02:59.040 --> 03:02.240 So we have two concerns with all of this. WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 62 02:59.040 --> 03:02.240 So we have two concerns with all of this. 63 03:02.240 --> 03:07.920 First of all, we need to think about wireless access control. 64 03:07.920 --> 03:10.690 We're probably immediately going to think about wireless encryption and we'll 65 03:10.690 --> 03:11.120 get to 66 03:11.120 --> 03:14.360 that, but access control is very important. 67 03:14.360 --> 03:19.510 What's stopping this threat actor from actually using this access point to gain 68 03:19.510 --> 03:20.200 access to 69 03:20.200 --> 03:21.800 the rest of our network? 70 03:21.800 --> 03:26.790 Well, that's problematic because if this was a wired scenario, the threat actor 71 03:26.790 --> 03:27.240 would 72 03:27.240 --> 03:32.260 somehow have to end up inside one of these buildings and plug into the wall and WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 72 03:27.240 --> 03:32.260 somehow have to end up inside one of these buildings and plug into the wall and 73 03:32.260 --> 03:32.520 then 74 03:32.520 --> 03:37.440 ride the ethernet cables to wherever there's the nearest switch. 75 03:37.440 --> 03:41.760 That's what would be required for wired communication access. 76 03:41.760 --> 03:46.050 And so we hope that the physical security of the building, namely how did they 77 03:46.050 --> 03:46.680 get into 78 03:46.680 --> 03:51.300 this space that that would help us to prevent them from accessing our wired 79 03:51.300 --> 03:52.120 network. 80 03:52.120 --> 03:56.190 But now that we're wireless, in the same way that this access point is sending 81 03:56.190 --> 03:56.720 signals 82 03:56.720 --> 04:00.120 such that the threat actor can receive them, well, the threat actor can send WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 82 03:56.720 --> 04:00.120 such that the threat actor can receive them, well, the threat actor can send 83 04:00.120 --> 04:00.840 signals back 84 04:00.840 --> 04:04.170 to the access point and the access point can receive it and the threat actor 85 04:04.170 --> 04:04.760 never had 86 04:04.760 --> 04:07.320 to leave their car out in the parking lot. 87 04:07.320 --> 04:14.280 And so access control is just as big of a deal as some of our privacy concerns. 88 04:14.280 --> 04:19.200 So how do we prevent access from an unauthorized person? 89 04:19.200 --> 04:22.640 Well, we're going to use some of the same mechanisms, really similar mechanisms 90 04:22.640 --> 04:22.880 that 91 04:22.880 --> 04:25.120 we use on the wired side. 92 04:25.120 --> 04:30.760 And especially we want to use the concept of authentication. WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 92 04:25.120 --> 04:30.760 And especially we want to use the concept of authentication. 93 04:30.760 --> 04:32.620 We think about authentication. 94 04:32.620 --> 04:38.880 This is claiming who I am in such a way that I can prove who it is that I claim 95 04:38.880 --> 04:40.080 to be. 96 04:40.080 --> 04:45.170 So it's not just me saying that I'm the CEO or maybe even some other staff 97 04:45.170 --> 04:46.040 member. 98 04:46.040 --> 04:49.640 It's also going to require proof. 99 04:49.640 --> 04:53.280 Now there's a lot of different methods for proving my identity. 100 04:53.280 --> 04:59.520 For example, a lot of us just use a username and password combination. 101 04:59.520 --> 05:03.960 And this is starting to feel a little bit archaic in the modern network. WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 101 04:59.520 --> 05:03.960 And this is starting to feel a little bit archaic in the modern network. 102 05:03.960 --> 05:08.690 For example, we can use elements such as multi-factor authentication, sometimes 103 05:08.690 --> 05:09.240 texting 104 05:09.240 --> 05:14.060 a number, you know, some kind of authentication number to our phone, a one-time 105 05:14.060 --> 05:14.880 password. 106 05:14.880 --> 05:19.100 So that's OTPs here, this one-time password concept that says, "Hey, here's a 107 05:19.100 --> 05:19.680 six-digit 108 05:19.680 --> 05:21.800 ID that will let you log in." 109 05:21.800 --> 05:24.960 I can sometimes not even have to worry about a text message. 110 05:24.960 --> 05:29.570 I could use a multi-factor authentication app to perform this exact same 111 05:29.570 --> 05:30.560 operation. WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 111 05:29.570 --> 05:30.560 operation. 112 05:30.560 --> 05:34.040 We can also use certificates. 113 05:34.040 --> 05:36.200 Certificates would be loaded onto a machine. 114 05:36.200 --> 05:41.440 So they take a little bit more work to get it to function. 115 05:41.440 --> 05:46.060 But if I have a laptop or a mobile device, I can place a certificate onto the 116 05:46.060 --> 05:47.000 device. 117 05:47.000 --> 05:52.390 But in theory, the hope is that this certificate being on this device proves 118 05:52.390 --> 05:53.280 that it belongs 119 05:53.280 --> 05:55.400 to a specific user. 120 05:55.400 --> 05:59.980 And so some combination of these are probably what we're going to consider for 121 05:59.980 --> 06:00.320 deploying WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 121 05:59.980 --> 06:00.320 deploying 122 06:00.320 --> 06:04.940 to a wireless network, but it all relates back, again, to our authentication, 123 06:04.940 --> 06:05.600 improving 124 06:05.600 --> 06:07.600 that I am who I claim to be. 125 06:07.600 --> 06:13.450 Namely, or in this situation, if this user down here, user A and user B are on 126 06:13.450 --> 06:14.400 the network, 127 06:14.400 --> 06:20.410 I can claim, wirelessly, I suppose here, I can claim to be user A or user B for 128 06:20.410 --> 06:20.920 that 129 06:20.920 --> 06:21.920 matter. 130 06:21.920 --> 06:26.180 But if I don't have these elements, I can't actually authenticate and the 131 06:26.180 --> 06:27.080 network is going 132 06:27.080 --> 06:29.720 to reject that access attempt. 133 06:29.720 --> 06:31.200 So we're keeping the bad guys. WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 133 06:29.720 --> 06:31.200 So we're keeping the bad guys. 134 06:31.200 --> 06:35.530 We're keeping these threat actors off of our network, even though they have 135 06:35.530 --> 06:37.160 access via wireless 136 06:37.160 --> 06:38.240 communications. 137 06:38.240 --> 06:42.550 The other concept that we need to worry about, and this one is very important, 138 06:42.550 --> 06:42.960 is what would 139 06:42.960 --> 06:45.880 refer to as privacy. 140 06:45.880 --> 06:50.520 The primary mechanism we'll use to combat privacy is encryption. 141 06:50.520 --> 06:55.980 When we talk about privacy, what we really are concerned with is the concept of 142 06:55.980 --> 06:56.800 listening 143 06:56.800 --> 07:00.920 in, or eavesdropping, maybe we might call it. WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 143 06:56.800 --> 07:00.920 in, or eavesdropping, maybe we might call it. 144 07:00.920 --> 07:06.770 So listening in means that, again, I might want to communicate here to this 145 07:06.770 --> 07:07.880 access point. 146 07:07.880 --> 07:12.920 I've got my laptop and there's a threat actor out in the parking lot listening. 147 07:12.920 --> 07:16.870 So again, I might think that I'm doing this with my wireless communications, 148 07:16.870 --> 07:17.800 but the reality 149 07:17.800 --> 07:22.960 is that sending to the access point means that I'm sending radially out. 150 07:22.960 --> 07:26.520 So cool, the access point does receive my communication. 151 07:26.520 --> 07:27.520 Not so cool. 152 07:27.520 --> 07:28.760 So does the threat actor. 153 07:28.760 --> 07:30.520 They both receive my communication. WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 153 07:28.760 --> 07:30.520 They both receive my communication. 154 07:30.520 --> 07:34.510 They can both listen in and that's good for the access point and not good for 155 07:34.510 --> 07:35.160 the threat 156 07:35.160 --> 07:36.160 actor. 157 07:36.160 --> 07:40.300 And so this is where we'd want to use some kind of means of protecting my 158 07:40.300 --> 07:41.320 communication 159 07:41.320 --> 07:45.440 and encryption is nothing new and as far as network security is concerned. 160 07:45.440 --> 07:49.480 However, again, when we relate this back to the wired network, we don't use a 161 07:49.480 --> 07:49.880 whole 162 07:49.880 --> 07:54.080 lot of encryption between wired stations and wired clients. 163 07:54.080 --> 07:58.600 And the reason for that is simply for a threat actor to listen in on a wired 164 07:58.600 --> 07:59.760 communication, 165 07:59.760 --> 08:05.050 they would actually need access to that in some capacity, either in some way WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 165 07:59.760 --> 08:05.050 they would actually need access to that in some capacity, either in some way 166 08:05.050 --> 08:05.880 inserting 167 08:05.880 --> 08:09.310 themselves into the middle of that communication or possibly using something 168 08:09.310 --> 08:10.240 more sophisticated 169 08:10.240 --> 08:13.360 to listen in on what's happening on that wire. 170 08:13.360 --> 08:17.700 But it does still require physical access when we're talking about wired 171 08:17.700 --> 08:19.160 communications. 172 08:19.160 --> 08:23.910 Wireless communications are going to rely on encryption even more so than with 173 08:23.910 --> 08:24.320 wired 174 08:24.320 --> 08:28.080 communications that occur on the network. 175 08:28.080 --> 08:31.490 And this will make it so whatever sensitive information that I'm sending won't WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 175 08:28.080 --> 08:31.490 And this will make it so whatever sensitive information that I'm sending won't 176 08:31.490 --> 08:31.880 be able 177 08:31.880 --> 08:36.350 to be properly received by the threat actor because they'll still hear the 178 08:36.350 --> 08:37.160 signal that 179 08:37.160 --> 08:41.150 comes in, they can still listen into the signal, but now that signal is 180 08:41.150 --> 08:42.800 scrambled by my encryption. 181 08:42.800 --> 08:47.360 And in theory, they have no way to unscramble or decrypt that. 182 08:47.360 --> 08:50.720 Now we're going to talk about various encryption methods here. 183 08:50.720 --> 08:55.010 And there are methods that we might use on the enterprise side versus at home 184 08:55.010 --> 08:55.480 that will 185 08:55.480 --> 08:57.680 make it even harder to decrypt it. 186 08:57.680 --> 09:01.330 But we do need to recognize that there are limitations to some of these methods WEBVTT X-TIMESTAMP-MAP=LOCAL:00:00:00.000,MPEGTS:900000 186 08:57.680 --> 09:01.330 But we do need to recognize that there are limitations to some of these methods 187 09:01.330 --> 09:01.640 that 188 09:01.640 --> 09:04.480 are pretty common out there, especially pre shared keys. 189 09:04.480 --> 09:08.320 But either way, let's go ahead and move into a little bit more details around 190 09:08.320 --> 09:08.840 this. 191 09:08.840 --> 09:12.850 But we just wanted to kind of lay the groundwork of saying that we care greatly 192 09:12.850 --> 09:13.920 about addressing 193 09:13.920 --> 09:19.020 access control and privacy and any security mechanisms that we propose are 194 09:19.020 --> 09:20.120 going to ideally 195 09:20.120 --> 09:21.720 address both of these. 196 09:21.720 --> 09:24.120 But we might find that some of them address one and not the other. 197 09:24.120 --> 09:34.120 [BLANK_AUDIO]